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THE PLEADING OF GENERAL AND SPECIAL
DAMAGES IN A PERSONAL INJURY
ACTION IN PENNSYLVANIA
In 1968, G. Thomas Gates, President Judge of the Lebanon
County Court of Common Pleas, noted
the evident confusion among the several district courts as
to the nature of general and special damages and the con-
sequent duty to plead generally or to specifically state the
damages .... 1
In so observing, Judge Gates was merely echoing the similar assess-
ments of his colleagues made frequently in their opinions. 2
The Pennsylvania practice of pleading damages in a trespass
action involving personal injuries presents a bewildering picture
to a member of the bar surveying that area of the law for the first
time. Imprecise definitions, misinterpreted appellate court deci-
sions, an almost total lack of procedural guidelines and a myriad of
conflicting cases have all combined to place a roadblock in the path
of the practitioner interested in drafting a technically correct com-
plaint.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the uncertainty and
inconsistency surrounding the practice of pleading general and spe-
cial damages in a personal injury action in Pennsylvania. More
specifically, this Comment will analyze what originally caused the
confusion and, more importantly, what sustains this confusion to-
day. The varied pleading procedures of many of the common pleas
courts will be illustrated and critically analyzed., Finally, sug-
gestions will be made as to instituting uniform pleading practices
throughout Pennsylvania.
1. Magdule v. Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192, 194 (C.P. Leb. 1968).
2. Pittman v. Powell, 9 Adams 113 (Pa. C.P. 1967); Fontana v.
Mellot, 4 Adams 162 (Pa. C.P. 1963); Kearns v. Peterson, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d
213 (C.P. Mercer 1961); Rosenblum v. United Natural Gas Co. (No. 2), 3
Mercer 130, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 239 (C.P. 1958); Tyson v. Peters, 20 Beaver
175 (Pa. C.P. 1958); Mann v. Leith, 26 Leh. L.J. 305 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Quick v.
Lichtenwalner, 84 Pa. D. & C. 546 (C.P. Columb. 1953); Pretz v.
Fricke, 20 Leh. L.J. 405 (Pa. C.P. 1944); Watson v. Rich, 42 Pa. D. & C. 475
(C.P. Mercer 1941).
3. Decisions from the following counties were surveyed in research-
ing this Comment: Adams, Beaver, Bucks, Centre, Columbia, Crawford,
Cumberland, Dauphin, Erie, Fayette, Lackawanna, Lancaster, Lawrence,
Lebanon, Lehigh, Luzerne, Lycoming, Mercer, Mifflin, Monroe, Mont-
gomery, Northumberland, Schuylkill, Somerset, Washington, Westmore-
land and York. No pertinent decisions from Allegheny County or from
Philadelphia County were found.
The scope of this Comment is limited to examining four items
of damage frequently claimed in an action for personal injuries:
(1) pain and suffering, (2) hospital and medical expenses, (3) im-
pairment of earning power and (4) loss of earnings. Each of the
four items will be examined in two respects-first, how to plead
the amount claimed for that particular damage up to the filing of
the complaint (for example, past impairment of earning power)
and, second, how to plead the amount claimed for the damage in
the future (for example, future hospital expenses).
I. DEFINITIONS
Much of the confusion today in the pleading of general and
special damages is due to the fact that the various Pennsylvania
courts have not used the same definitions of special and general
items of damage. Many common pleas courts have used the defi-
nitions set down in 1917 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Leonard v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company.4 A fewer number
of courts have cited with approval the set of definitions used by the
same court in 1933 in Parsons Trading Company v. Dohan.5 Be-
sides the resulting lack of uniformity, the importance of this di-
vergence is that the two sets of definitions, when compared, say
very different things. Moreover, both sets are very imprecise in
defining special and general damages and in distinguishing between
the two.
The majority of the common pleas courts surveyed in this
Comment have adopted the definitions found in the Leonard deci-
sion. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court therein defined an item of
general damage as one which necessarily follows as a natural and
probable result of the injury, whereas an item of special damage was
defined as one of a special nature and, as such, not the usual conse-
quence of the alleged wrong.
7
An inconsistency is readily apparent in the court's use of the
words "necessarily" and "usual." While general damages are de-
fined very precisely through the use of the absolute term, "neces-
sarily," the court, instead of holding, as it logically should have,
that special damages are those which do not "necessarily" follow as
4. 259 Pa. 51, 102 A. 279 (1917).
5. 312 Pa. 464, 167 A. 310 (1933). Although this case is an as-
sumpsit action, it is very frequently cited in trespass cases. The reason
for this is that in Pennsylvania the same definitions of general and special
damages are used both in trespass actions and in assumpsit actions.
Clark v. Steele, 255 Pa. 330, 99 A. 1001 (1917).
6. Ziegenfuss v. Reed, 62 Sch. Leg. Rec. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1966); Scott v.
Karpinski, 5 Bucks 280 (Pa. C.P. 1956); Pichcuskie v. Antonio, 27
Northumb. L.J. 108 (Pa. C.P. 1955); River Park Gardens, Inc. v. Martin, 54
Lanc. Rev. 341 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Hause v. Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, Inc.,
2 Cumb. 70 (Pa. C.P. 1951); Kachuba v. Shade Coal Mining Co., 15 Somerset
142 (Pa. C.P. 1950); Pretz v. Fricke, 20 Leh. L.J. 405 (Pa. C.P. 1949).
7. 259 Pa. 51, 56, 102 A. 279, 281 (1917) (emphasis added).
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a natural result of the injury, substituted a comparatively inexact
word, "usual." In place of a definite demarcation to distinguish
the two types of damages, the court set up a very ambiguous di-
viding line. The logical inference from combining the Leonard defi-
nitions is that some items of damage must not be general since they
do not by necessity flow from the facts of the injury, but they are,
on the other hand, not special because they usually but not neces-
sarily, flow from the injury.
Although objectionable in part, the Leonard definitions are
at least quite helpful to the draftsman of a complaint in that they
set up a precise method of determining whether a particular item
of damage is general or not; if it "necessarily" results from the in-
jury it is a general item of damage. The definitions used by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Parsons Trading Company v. Do-
han9 cannot be judged so favorably.'0
Damages are either general, those which are the usual
and ordinary consequences of the wrong done, or special,
those which are not the usual and ordinary consequences of
the wrong done, but which depend upon special circum-
stances.1
Gone is the very workable "necessarily" standard of Leonard
replaced by the ambiguity of the Parsons "usual and ordinary"
yardstick. The draftsman attempting to distinguish between spe-
cial and general damages for the purpose of pleading them cor-
rectly will find little assistance if he wishes to so distinguish the
two on the basis of the Parsons definitions.
12
8. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Laing v. Calder, 8 Pa. 481
(1848), did adopt the strict "necessarily" standard for both general and spe-
cial damages as is recommended here. Although the case was cited in both
Leonard v. Balt. & 0. R.R., 259 Pa. 51, 56, 102 A. 279, 281 (1917), and Parsons
Trading Co. v. Dohan, 312 Pa. 464, 468, 167 A. 310, 312 (1933), its definitions
were not adopted in either decision nor has any other decision been found
which has used the Laing definitions.
9. 312 Pa. 464, 167 A. 310 (1933).
10. The Parsons definitions have been adopted by the Lebanon Court
of Common Pleas in Magdule v. Feather, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 192, 195 (C.P.
Leb. 1968). Several common pleas courts have adopted both the Parsons
and the Leonard definitions. See cases cited note 13 infra. Since the
Parsons definitions are the ones currently used by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court as indicated in Kosco v. Hachmeister, Inc., 288 Pa. 292, 152
A.2d 673 (1959), it is logical to assume that other common pleas courts,
while referring to Parsons for guidance, have not expressly so indicated
in their opinions.
11. Parsons Trading Co. v. Dohan, 312 Pa. 464, 468, 167 A. 310, 312
(1933).
12. But see C. McCoRMicK, McCoRMIcK ON DAMAGES § 8 (1935)
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMIcK]:
The distinction, for this purpose, has been most frequently defined
In passing, it should be mentioned that a few decisions have
combined the two different sets of definitions into one.13
The importance of these semantic inconsistencies and uncer-
tainties will be apparent as it becomes clear that the majority of
the specific items of damage to be discussed in this Comment
fall into the area left uncategorized by the inexact definitions.
II. STATUTORY GUIDELINES FOR THE PLEADING OF GENERAL
AND SPECIAL DAMAGES: PAST AND PRESENT
Assuming the draftsman has determined from the definitions
that the items of damage to be pleaded are either general or spe-
cial, the next step is to determine how they are to be correctly
pleaded. As was the case with the definitions, Pennsylvania proce-
dure in this area is disturbingly imprecise.
When special items of damage are being claimed, one pre-
requisite should be satisfied before the actual items of damage are
averred. It is established Pennsylvania procedure that such dam-
ages may not be proved at the trial unless the complaint first avers
the special facts giving rise to them.14 For example, Attorney A,
representing client P, a housewife, in a personal injury action, drafts
a complaint in which he alleges that as a result of the negligence of
the defendant, P requires the services of a fulltime maid, M. Being
an item of special damage, A would be unable to introduce evidence
at the trial of P's need for M's services unless the complaint con-
tained sufficient facts explaining this need. Thus, the complaint
should indicate that P's injuries were so crippling that she would
be unable again to do housework or to cook for her family of four
and that M's services were required to perform these necessary
tasks.1"
By including such language, A has laid a proper foundation in
the complaint upon which evidence may be introduced at the trial
of the necessity of M's services. Such specificity need not be used
when general items of damages are being sought, for the state-
as one between those losses which "necessarily" flow from the
breaches or wrongdoing alleged-these being "general" damage-
and those which are not "necessary" but merely natural and proxi-
mate results. This seems, however, to put the matter rather too
strongly, since few indeed are the injurious results which are "nec-
essary" in the sense of being invariable and inevitable conse-
quences of the kind of wrongdoing described.
Id. at 33.
13. Rosenblum v. United Natural Gas Co. (No. 2), 3 Mercer 130, 14
Pa. D. & C.2d 239 (C.P. 1958); Quick v. Lichtenwalner, 84 Pa. D. & C. 546
(C.P. Columb. 1953); Nickerson v. Boro of Kingston, 42 Luz. Leg. Reg. 167
(Pa. C.P. 1952); Deligatti v. Mt. Pleasant Borough, 76 Pa. D. & C. 200
(C.P. West. 1951). No attempt will be made to analyze the confusion re-
sulting from this unlikely mixture of two incompatible sets of definitions.
Reference to any of the above cited decisions will illustrate the confusion.
14. Parsons Trading Co. v. Dohan, 312 Pa. 464, 468, 167 A. 310, 312
(1933).
15. See generally Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 364 (1954).
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ment of the facts showing the wrong done by the defendant is suf-
ficient to entitle the plaintiff to establish those damages at the
trial. 16
Turning to the question of the applicable statutory guidelines
for the pleading of general and special damages, the Pennsylvania
Rules of Civil Procedure dealing with this provide that "[a] ver-
ments of time, place and items of special damage shall be specifi-
cally stated."'
17
This rule leaves essential questions unanswered. What does
"specifically stated" mean? Does it mean only that special items
of damage must be expressly mentioned in the complaint or does
it require, in addition to an express statement of the item, further
specificity or itemization?
For example, if a draftsman wishes to plead specially two doc-
tors' bills, is the following allegation sufficient: "As a result of the
aforesaid negligence of defendant, plaintiff has incurred medical
bills. Plaintiff herein claims from the defendant the amount ex-
pended for those bills?"' 8 Does such an allegation satisfy the re-
quirement of "specifically stated" or must the amount claimed be
also alleged or, even further, must the names of the specific doctors
along with the amounts paid to each plus the treatment received
from each also be alleged? The rule is far from clear. As to the
pleading of general damages the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure are silent.'9
From a practical point of view, the real importance of plead-
ing damages correctly can be put into the proper perspective only
when it is understood how much time and work is wasted if they
are incorrectly pleaded.
For example, Attorney A represents P in a trespass action
against D. P, due to the injuries he suffered as a result of D's negli-
gence, was unable to perform his regular job for a period of two
weeks. P now seeks to recover his loss of earnings. The complaint
alleges that due to D's negligence P suffered a loss of earnings in
the amount of $800. The allegation does not include the name of
P's employer, his pay rate or the nature of his employment. D's
attorney files a preliminary objection in the form of a motion for a
more specific pleading20 requesting further information concern-
16. Parsons Trading Co. v. Dohan, 312 Pa. 464, 468, 167 A. 310, 312
(1933).
17. PA. R. Civ. P. 1019(f) (emphasis added).
18. E.g., Magdule v. Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192, 195 (C.P. Leb. 1968).
19. Id. at 194.
20. PA. R. Civ. P. 1017(b) (3).
ing the claim for loss of wages. This preliminary objection could
be filed anytime within twenty days after the filing of the com-
plaint.2' A draftsman has four options open to him: (1) ignore the
preliminary objection, (2) file a preliminary objection to the pre-
liminary objection, (3) file an amended complaint giving to D the
information sought or (4) contest the applicability of the prelimi-
nary objection.2 2  Regardless of the course of action chosen, valu-
able time and work will be wasted which could have been avoided
originally by pleading the damages correctly. The contented client
is one who has his rights adjudicated promptly. A two month de-
lay in obtaining recovery could place the client in a position of fi-
nancial crisis in the interim.
Many courts that have recognized the failure of the Pennsyl-
vania Rules of Civil Procedure to set up useful directives for the
pleading of damages have compensated for this failure by unoffi-
cially re-adopting the pleading practices in effect prior to the adop-
tion of Rule 1019(f) in 1947.23 This practice had been governed by
the Practice Act of 1915.24
The provision of the Practice Act 25 pertinent to the pleading
of general and special damages was Section Five, entitled Contents
of Pleading:
Every pleading shall contain, and contain only, a state-
ment in a concise and summary form of the material facts
on which the party pleading relies for his claim, or defense,
as the case may be, but not the evidence by which they are
to be proved, or inferences, or conclusions of law, and shall
be divided into paragraphs numbered consecutively, each
of which shall contain but one material allegation....20
It is not clear just what advantage the above quoted section
has over Rule 1019(f). Section Five does not even mention the
word "damages," let alone establish guidelines for the pleading of
general and special damages. Yet, during the many years the Prac-
tice Act was utilized, the common pleas courts developed a defi-
nite set of rules as to the pleading of damages. 27 If the logical basis
21. PA. R. Civ. P. 1026.
22. 2 R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL PRACTICE § 1017 (b)
(1960); 2A R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON PENNSYLVANIA CIVIL PRACTICE § 1028
(1969).
23. Groskettler v. Rudnick, 54 Sch. Leg. Rec. 145 (Pa. C.P. 1958);
Rosenblum v. United Natural Gas Co. (No. 2), 3 Mercer 130, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d
239 (C.P. 1958); Tyson v. Peters, 20 Beaver 175 (Pa. C.P. 1958); Mann v.
Leith, 26 Leh. L.J. 305 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Weber v. Shaffer, 71 Montg. L. Rev.
58 (Pa. C.P. 1954); Mellet v. Fishman, 43 Luz. Leg. Reg. 253 (Pa. C.P. 1953);
Withers v. Sheffer, 65 Dauph. 394 (Pa. C.P. 1953); Misner v. Service Coal
Co., 45 Sch. Leg. Rec. 185 (Pa. C.P. 1950).
24. Law of May 14, 1915, No. 202, [1915] Pa. Laws 483 (suspended
1947).
25. For a detailed study of The Practice Act of 1915 see G. SMITH,
SMITH'S PRACTICE ACT OF 1915 (4th ed. 1936).
26. Law of May 14, 1915, No. 202, § 5 [1915] Pa. Laws 483 (suspended
1947).
27. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 386 n.96 (1953) (cases cited therein).
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for these rules cannot be found in Section Five, as it apparently
cannot, since the section does not even mention the term "damages,"
the question becomes just what was the supportive authority for
these rules. No Pennsylvania court decision has ever answered
this question. To go one step further, upon what basis can the
courts today, that have gone to Practice Act decisions for guid-
ance, argue that those decisions have any more authority than any
decision which could be made on the basis of today's Rule 1019(f)?
Both rules present almost equally unhelpful guidelines for the
draftsman but the distinction is that Section Five of The Practice
Act was suspended more than twenty years ago while Rule 1019(f)
is the operative rule today.
28
Possibly the practice of referring to Practice Act decisions as
authority for today's rulings could be justified if it were a uniform
practice throughout the state. But that is clearly not the case.
Several courts give no recognition to the Practice Act or to their
previous decisions under it.
29
Not only do some common pleas courts today refuse to look
back for guidance to prior procedure, a number of courts, when gov-
erned procedurally by the Practice Act, held that Section Five was
of no aid in directing how damages in personal injury actions should
be alleged.30 These decisions uniformly held that the prior prac-
tice under the Act of 1887 had to be consulted for guidance.8 1
An examination of the Act of 1887 indicates that the section on
pleading is, just like its successors, vague and, as such, is of little
practical significance to the practitioner.
Thus, it is clear that a major cause of the common pleas courts'
confusion over the proper method of pleading damages in a per-
sonal injury action is the failure of the various Pennsylvania proce-
dural codes to establish concrete pleading guidelines.
28. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 386 (1953).
29. Boyer v. Krall, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 36 (C.P. Leb. 1969); Magdule v.
Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192 (C.P. Leb. 1968); Ball v. Fenstermaker, 8 Lyco.
60, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 312 (Pa. C.P. 1961); Sprout v. Veterans Home Club,
2 Centre L.J. 79 (Pa. C.P. 1961); Nickerson v. Boro of Kingston, 42 Luz.
Leg. Reg. 167 (Pa. C.P. 1952); Deligatti v. Mt. Pleasant Borough, 76 Pa. D.
& C. 200 (C.P. West. 1951).
30. Tyson v. Peters, 20 Beaver 175 (Pa. C.P. 1958); Watson v.
Rich, 42 Pa. D. & C. 475 (C.P. Mercer 1948); Pretz v. Fricke, 20 Leh. L.J. 405
(Pa. C.P. 1944); Kushel v. Steinberger, 40 Dauph. 383 (Pa. C.P. 1935) (and
cases cited therein).
31. Law of May 25, 1887, No. 158, § 3, [1887] Pa. Laws 271 (suspended
1915).
III. THE PLEADING OF GENERAL DAMAGES: CURRENT PRACTICES
Given the atmosphere of uncertainty resulting from the use of
imprecise definitions and from the virtual vacuum of procedural
guideposts, it is very easy to understand how non-uniformity has
developed in the area of pleading general damages in a trespass ac-
tion for personal injuries.
Three procedurally incompatible methods of pleading general
damages have been cited with favor by the various Pennsylvania
common pleas courts.3 2 A separate discussion of each method fol-
lows.
A. Method 1: General Damages Need Not Be Pleaded At All
Proponents of two of the three methods of pleading general
damages claim that their respective methods have received the ap-
proval of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.33 This can hardly be
accurate since the two sides are taking the same appellate court
language and interpreting it differently. In Parsons Trading Com-
pany v. Dohan, 4 the court held:
General damages may be proved without being spe-
cially pleaded (Clark v. Steele, 255 Pa. 330; Leonard v. B. &
0. R.R. Co., 259 Pa. 51), the averment of the facts showing
the wrong done being sufficient to entitle plaintiff to estab-
lish them. 5
The key language is "specially pleaded." Different courts
have interpreted these words to mean two different things. Those
courts favoring Method 1-that general damages need not be
pleaded at all-have interpreted the Parsons decision and also the
Leonard v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company36 decision, to mean
that the particular item of general damage being claimed (as, for ex-
ample, pain and suffering) need not even be mentioned in the com-
plaint.3 7 The rationale for this position is that the averment of the
facts showing the wrong done is sufficient notice to the defendant
that items of general damage are going to be claimed at the trial.38
Anderson,3 9 and consequently those decisions which have cited
him with approval,40 agrees that the Parsons language is suscepti-
ble to both that interpretation and to the Method 2 interpretation
32. These three methods of pleading general damages are summar-
ized in Magdule v. Feather, 44 D. & C.2d 192, 195 (C.P. Leb. 1968).
33. Id.
34. 312 Pa. 464, 167 A. 310 (1933).
35. Id. at 468, 167 A. at 312.
36. 259 Pa. 51, 102 A. 279 (1917).
37. Magdule v. Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192 (C.P. Leb. 1968)
(dictum); Ziegenfuss v. Reed, 62 Sch. Leg. Rec. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1966) (dictum);
Deligatti v. Mt. Pleasant Borough, 76 Pa. D. & C. 200 (C.P. West. 1951)
(dictum); Pretz v. Fricke, 20 Leh. L.J. 405 (Pa. C.P. 1944) (dictum).
38. See MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 8 at 35.
39. 2A R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON CIVIL PRACTICE § 1019.64 (1969).
40. Cases cited note 43 infra.
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which is discussed below. Anderson states that
[li t is therefore optional with the plaintiff as to whether
and how he pleads such damages. If he wishes, he may
either make no averment with respect to such damages or
may plead them generally; they need not be specially
pleaded.
41
Really the matter is of little more than theoretical significance
since those common pleas courts which have supported the Method
1 form of pleading have done so only by way of dictum. The au-
thoritative holding of these decisions have, in fact, always sup-
ported the Method 2 interpretation.
B. Method 2: General Damages Require Only A General Aver-
ment
Since the support for Method 1 pleading practices has never
risen above the height of dictum, Method 2 is the only one of the
three methods which seemingly has both Pennsylvania Supreme
Court approval4 2 and authoritative lower case support.43 Method
1, by some interpretations, has the former but not the latter.
Method 3, as discussed below, has the lower court support but no
appellate authority. Procedurally, Method 2-that general dam-
ages require nothing more than a general averment-is very easy
to apply when drafting a complaint. For example, the draftsman
who is claiming damages for past medical bills and for pain and
suffering should, in separate paragraphs of the complaint, state that
as a result of the defendant's negligence his client incurred medical
bills and was forced to endure pain and suffering for which he
claims damages. These separate paragraphs are followed by the
appropriate ad damnum clause.
44
41. 2A R. ANDERSON, ANDERSON CIVL PACTIcE § 1019.64 at 259 (1969)
(footnotes omitted).
42. Leonard v. Balt. & 0. R.R., 259 Pa. 51, 102 A. 279 (1917); Parsons
Trading Co. v. Dohan, 312 Pa. 464, 167 A. 310 (1933). The courts citing these
appellate court decisions fail to point out that procedurally these cases
involve situations where the defendant failed to object to plaintiff's alle-
gations of damages by way of preliminary objections and not where the
defendant timely objects through a motion for a more specific complaint.
43. Boyer v. Krall, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 36 (C.P. Leb. 1969); Magdule v.
Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192 (C.P. Leb. 1968); Ziegenfuss v. Reed, 62 Sch.
Leg. Rec. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1967); Ball v. Fenstermaker, 8 Lyco. 60, 24 Pa. D.
& C.2d 312 (C.P. 1961); Eby v. Sun Pipe Line Co., 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 190 (C.P.
Leh. 1960); Boyle v. Veterans Home of Tamaqua, 51 Sch. Leg. Rec. 46
(Pa. C.P. 1955); Quick v. Lichtenwalner, 84 Pa. D.& C. 546 (C.P. Columb.
1953); Nickerson v. Boro of Kingston, 42 Luz. Leg. Reg. 167 (Pa. C.P. 1952);
Deligatti v. Mt. Pleasant Borough, 76 Pa. D. & C. 200 (C.P. West. 1951);
Davis v. Carr, 61 Pa. D. & C. 479 (C.P. Bucks 1948).
44. PA. R. Civ. P. 1044 (b).
C. Method 3: General Damages Must Be Specifically Pleaded If
Susceptible Of Itemization
Method 3 is an oddity in that it is solely the creation of those
common pleas courts which insist on a high degree of particularity
in the pleading of general damages. No Pennsylvania appellate
court decision or rule of civil procedure supports such an exacting
requirement. 45  Seemingly, Method 3 is a carry-over from the
pleading procedures, as many courts interpreted them, under the
Practice Act of 1915.46
Given the lack of authority, either appellate or statutory, for
such a position, how do the Method 3 jurisdictions justify ignoring
the Leonard and Parsons decisions of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court which seem to support the Method 2 position? The answer
is that those courts requiring the itemization of general damages
feel that the Leonard and Parsons decisions, from a procedural
standpoint, are in no way incompatible with Method 3.47 An ex-
ample of this reasoning is found in the following excerpt from an
opinion by Judge McKay of Mercer County. After reviewing au-
thority for the proposition that general damages need only be gen-
erally averred (Method 2), Judge McKay questions the applica-
bility of such authority by observing:
It may be noted, however that the Supreme Court de-
cisions cited as support of this rule are cases in which it was
held that general damages could be proved at the trial
even though they were not specifically averred in the
pleadings. They do not deal directly with the question
whether, upon timely application in advance of trial, a de-
fendant may have the damages particularized.
48
Similarly, Judge Herman of Dauphin County in paraphrasing
an earlier opinion of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas
wrote:
Judge Hargest, the late President Judge of this court,
distinguishes the case of Leonard v. Baltimore & Ohio Rail-
road Company, 259 Pa. 51 (1917), cited by plaintiff for au-
thority that he need not plead specially expenses incurred
45. Magdule v. Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192, 195 (C.P. Leb. 1968).
46. A good discussion of this "carry-over" process is found in Rosen-
blum v. United Natural Gas Co. (No. 2), 3 Mercer 130, 133-36, 14 Pa. D. & C.
2d 239, 241-44 (1958). The opinion suggests the common pleas courts have
been willing to ignore the rule that general damages need not be spe-
cially pleaded and instead follow their earlier decisions under the Practice
Act.
47. Price v. Pennsylvania R.R., 72 Dauph. 336, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 518
(C.P. 1958); Rosenblum v. United Natural Gas Co. (No. 2), 3 Mercer 130,
14 Pa. D. & C.2d 239 (C.P. 1958); Bentz v. Knecht (No. 1), 26 Leh. L.J. 267
(Pa. C.P. 1955); Mann v. Leith, 26 Leh. L.J. 305 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Passigli v.
Lipson, 26 Leh. L.J. 413 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Pichcuskie v. Antonio, 27 North-
umb. L.J. 108 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Kushel v. Steinberger, 40 Dauph. 383
(Pa. C.P. 1935).
48. Rosenblum v. United Natural Gas Co. (No. 2), 3 Mercer 130, 133,
14 Pa. D. & C.2d 239, 242 (C.P. 1958) (emphasis added).
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for medical treatment or the loss of time from work. The
Leonard case held only that evidence might be offered at
the trial to show these damages without specially pleading
them, but in no sense did it hold that a defendant was not
entitled to have these damages specially pleaded if he asks
for it.
4 9
A simple example will help to crystalize the issue. Plaintiff,
in a complaint in trespass, makes a general allegation of medical
expenses and a claim for them. Defendant, by way of a preliminary
objection in the form of a motion for a more specific complaint,
requests an itemization of the medical expenses (doctors' names,
dates, amounts expended). Plaintiff argues, on the authority of
Leonard and Parsons, that general damages may be proved with-
out setting them out specifically in the complaint or itemizing
them. Defendant counters with the argument that those two de-
cisions are controlling only in a situation where the defendant
failed to file a preliminary objection to the complaint and instead
waited until after a verdict to protest, on appeal, the evidence plain-
tiff introduced under the general allegation of damages. Defend-
ant then points out that, unlike the Leonard and Parsons situa-
tions, he did make a timely objection at the trial level to the gen-
erality of the allegation of medical expenses. Plaintiff rebuts that
defendant has failed to show any appellate authority for the prop-
osition that, as a matter of right, he is entitled, merely by making
the objection, to an itemization of the medical bills. Thus, the
classic confrontation between Method 2, represented by the plain-
tiff's position, and Method 3, represented by the defendant's posi-
tion, is established.
The judge, who must rule on the above hypothetical prelimi-
nary objection, would be placed in an almost impossible situation
were he forced to base his decision solely on the cited appellate au-
thority. On the one hand, plaintiff's position is supported by two
Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions (Leonard and Parsons)
which have been convincingly distinguished by the defendant. A
secondary argument by the plaintiff, to the effect that other courts
have failed to distinguish Leonard and Parsons as the defendant
has done, makes a point lacking in any real authority. It is not
clear from these common pleas court opinions5" if this procedural
distinction had been noted by the courts and thus discarded as being
without controlling merit or whether these courts have blindly
cited Leonard or Parsons without even observing that there was a
49. Price v. Pennsylvania R.R., 72 Dauph. 336, 344, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d
518, 528-29 (C.P. 1958) (emphasis added).
50. See cases cited note 43 supra.
distinction to be made. But, on the other hand, the strength of de-
fendant's argument is illusively rooted in a negative type of logic.
Though he distinguishes the appellate authority cited by the plain-
tiff, he is unable to cite any appellate authority to support the posi-
tion he espouses and instead attempts to reason that the mere un-
dermining of plaintiff's position automatically establishes the au-
thority of his own position. Clearly, this is faulty logic. What it
does prove is that neither Method 2 nor Method 3 is supported by
appellate authority. The merits of the two positions must instead
be evaluated on a different level-the underlying policy considera-
tions behind each position.
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR SPECIFICITY V. THE ARGUMENT
FOR GENERALITY IN PLEADING GENERAL DAMAGES
The common pleas court which would make the ruling on the
motion for a more specific complaint in a case similar to the above
hypothetical would be placed in an intellectually challenging and
certainly enviable position. To make the proper ruling would be
challenging in the sense that both the argument for generality in
the pleading of general damages (Method 2) and the argument for
specificity (Method 3) are well grounded in convincing reasoning.
But the court would be in an enviable position in the sense that, un-
like most of the other issues before it for decision, its ruling would
not be predetermined by the prior dictates of appellate authority.
Instead, the court could make its final decision on the basis that, af-
ter having heard all the arguments for and against each of the posi-
tions, it could choose the one which the court believes best serves
the needs of the local members of the bar and of the bench and
fulfills the most relevant policy considerations.
A. The Argument for Specificity
Most common pleas courts that require the itemization of gen-
eral damages when the items of damage are susceptible to being set
out with such specificity 5' place prime emphasis on the protection
of the defendant's rights as the major justification for their posi-
tion.52 Some of these courts have tersely stated that the defendant
51. For example, pain and suffering, while considered to be a general
item of damage, is not the type of damage which would be susceptible to
itemization and, thus, would never be pleaded according to Method 3. On
the other hand, hospital expenses, considered by some courts to be a gen-
eral item of damage, would be susceptible to itemization in the complaint.
See McCoRMICK, supra note 12, § 8 at 35.
52. While this section specifically deals with the reasoning under-
lying those court decisions which have required general damages to be
specially pleaded, the same arguments are used by many other courts to
support their categorization of a particular item of damage as a special
damage rather than as a general damage. In other words, the same ra-
tionale is used by those courts which state that even though an item of
damage is a general one it must be specially pleaded and by those courts
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has a right to the information without explaining further the na-
ture or origin of this right.53 Many decisions, however, have sought
to clarify this concept. The majority of those decisions have rea-
soned that in order to be able to prepare an adequate defense the
defendant must have specific information in regard to the claimed
damages. 4 One court was even more specific, reasoning that it
was conceivable that a defendant, even though conceding liability,
would need the information in order to contest the amount of dam-
age claimed by the plaintiff.
55
A minority of the Method 3 courts analyze this conflict over
generality or specificity in pleading general damages from the
viewpoint of the plaintiff. Some of these courts reason that there is
no disadvantage to the plaintiff if he is required to be more spe-
cific in his pleading of general damages.56 Two courts have held
that the plaintiff might as well disclose the information in the com-
plaint and, by doing so, avoid the necessity for discovery. 57
Some of the courts supporting greater specificity justify this
support on a conceptual interpretation of the purpose of pleading
rather than by its effects on the immediate parties to the litiga-
tion.58 The majority of these courts have held that because
Pennsylvania has retained fact pleading, 59 as opposed to the notice
pleading system found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
in the many states which have adopted them, this retention of fact
that see the same damage to be special and, therefore, required to be
pleaded specially. The common link then is not in the categorization
of the damage as either general or special but, instead, is in the manner in
which the damage, once categorized, should be pleaded.
53. Ball v. Fenstermaker, 8 Lyco. 60, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 312 (C.P. 1961);
Eget v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 49 Luz. Leg. Reg. 147 (Pa.
C.P. 1957).
54. Cattarius v. Horn, 77 Dauph. 8 (Pa. C.P. 1961); Rosenblum v.
United Natural Gas Co. (No. 2), 3 Mercer 130, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 239 (C.P.
1958); Bowers v. Borough of New Brighton, 14 Beaver 200 (Pa. C.P. 1954);
Winders v. Elby, 68 Montg. L. Rev. 288 (Pa. C.P. 1952); Kofsky v. Harris,
44 Lanc. Rev. 260 (Pa. C.P. 1934).
55. Rosenblum v. United Natural Gas Co. (No. 2), 3 Mercer 130, 134,
14 Pa. D. & C.2d 239, 244 (C.P. 1958).
56. Tyson v. Peters, 30 Beaver 175 (Pa. C.P. 1958); Kushel v. Stein-
berger, 40 Dauph. 383 (Pa. C.P. 1935).
57. Sprout v. Veterans Home Club, 2 Centre L.J. 79 (Pa. C.P. 1961);
Peluso v. Primo, 14 Law. L.J. 85 (Pa. C.P. 1955).
58. National Novelty Co. v. Zuvich, 71 Dauph. 372, 16 Pa. D. & C.2d
359 (C.P. 1959); Tyson v. Peters, 20 Beaver 175 (Pa. C.P. 1958); Withers v.
Sheffer, 65 Dauph. 394 (Pa. C.P. 1953); Hause v. Kramer Bros. Freight
Lines, 2 Cumb. 70 (Pa. C.P. 1951).
59. See generally, Amram, A Reply to Professor Wright, 101 U. PA. L.
REv. 948 (1953); Graubart, Rejoinder From Pennsylvania, 101 U. PA. L. REv.
959 (1953); Wright, Modern Pleading and The Pennsylvania Rules, 101
U. PA. L. REv. 909 (1953).
pleading is indicative of a statewide policy that pleadings should
contain a full disclosure of all the material facts and relevant cir-
cumstances. 60 Specifically, this mean that general damages should
be pleaded specifically when they are susceptible of such itemiza-
tion."1
Finally, a few courts have retained their Method 3 position be-
cause they have felt compelled to follow their own earlier decisions,
though recognizing that the Method 2 arguments make some perti-
nent points.
6 2
B. The Argument for Generality
The ability of the judicial process to handle the pleading of
damages in such a fashion as to place the least possible strain on
the system is the common concern of the majority of those courts
that advocate the general form of pleading general damages. 3
Specifically, some of these courts stress that a major contribu-
tor to the clogged court calendars facing many trial judges is the
amount of time wasted in disposing of countless preliminary objec-
tions.64 Consequently, these courts have established the policy that
once the defendant is notified of all the general items of expense,
there can be no justification for time-consuming amendments of
the complaint merely for the purpose of further detailing these
items of damage.6 5 If the defendant believes he needs such infor-
mation in order to properly prepare his case, several courts insist
that he seek this clarification by way of discovery rather than re-
quire the trial judge to decide the matter through a ruling on pre-
liminary objections to the complaint.6 One decision summarized
the situation by indicating that the rationale behind the Pennsyl-
vania Rules of Civil Procedure is to avoid arbitrary and technical
requirements such as specific itemization of general damages.
7
Many courts view a large portion of the issues relating to dam-
ages brought before the trial court by preliminary objections as be-
ing really evidentiary matters which the plaintiff is not required to
divulge before the trial.6 8
60. Cases cited note 58 supra.
61. Id.
62. Rosenblum v. United Natural Gas Co. (No. 2), 3 Mercer 130, 14 Pa.
D. & C.2d 239 (C.P. 1958); Tyson v. Peters, 20 Beaver 175 (Pa. C.P. 1958);
Kushel v. Steinberger, 40 Dauph. 383 (Pa. C.P. 1935).
63. Cases cited notes 64, 66, 67 and 68 infra.
64. Magdule v. Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192 (C.P. Leb. 1968); Ball v.
Fenstermaker, 8 Lyco. 60, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 312 (C.P. 1961).
65. Magdule v. Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192 (C.P. Leb. 1968);
Ball v. Fenstermaker, 8 Lyco. 60, 24 Pa. D. & C.2d 312 (C.P. 1961).
66. Boyer v. Krall, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 36 (C.P. Leb. 1969); Harmes v.
Twin Brook Co., 62 Lanc. Rev. 59 (Pa. C.P. 1969); Magdule v. Feather, 44
Pa. D. & C.2d 192 (C.P. Leb. 1968); Ziegenfuss v. Reed, 62 Sch. Leg. Reg. 7
(Pa. C.P. 1966); Eby v. Sun Pipe Line Co., 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 190 (C.P. Leh.
1960).
67. Davis v. Carr, 61 Pa. D. & C. 479, 482 (C.P. Bucks 1948).
68. Magdule v. Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192 (C.P. Leb. 1968); Ziegen-
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Another argument supporting the Method 2 position was made
by Judge Gates of Lebanon County:
On the other hand, in those cases where the injuries are of
a serious and protracted nature, expenses are frequently
incurred subsequent to the drafting of the complaint, so
that a rigid requirement of specificity would compel
amendments to be made up to the date of the trial. 9
An argument made by one proponent of Method 2 pleading is
that the plaintiff should be given the choice as to the manner in
which he pleads his general damages.70 By adhering to this policy,
this court believes all the pleading problems related to damages are
eliminated. If the plaintiff chooses to plead the damages specifi-
cally then the defendant gets the desired information without any
corresponding pressure being placed on the plaintiff to so provide
this data. On the other hand, if plaintiff chooses to plead the dam-
ages generally then he is impliedly admitting that further informa-
tion will be made available through discovery if the defendant
chooses to pursue that course. 71 Also, this same court reasons that
the plaintiff's attorney, in the counties where less procedural for-
mality exists, may be willing to make this information available to
the defendant's attorney as a matter of professional courtesy.
72
Whichever of the courses plaintiff chooses to take, two things have
been accomplished: (1) the trial court has been relieved of the
burden of ruling on preliminary objections concerning damages and
(2) the plaintiff and the defendant, without pressure from the trial
court, have exchanged the pertinent information.
73
C. Today's Trend
Method 2 appears to be gaining in acceptance throughout the
state. Anderson describes this trend:
Unless the court feels that the plaintiff is merely flying in
the face of the rules and is not making any effort to inform
the court and the defendant of the true nature of his
claim, it is more than likely that the court will summarily
dismiss any preliminary objections to the complaint based
on the manner in which damages are pleaded. Conversely,
what the court will ordinarily do is suggest to the defend-
fuss v. Reed, 62 Sch. Leg. Rec. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1966); Kearns v. Peterson, 25
Pa. D. & C.2d 213 (C.P. Mercer 1961); Dienes v. Roberts, 3 Mercer 267
(Pa. C.P. 1959); Moyer v. Dallago, 51 Sch. Leg. Rec. 177 (Pa. C.P. 1956).
69. Magdule v. Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192, 195 (C.P. Leb. 1968).




ant that if he is really seeking information and is not
merely trying to delay or harass the plaintiff, the defendant
should resort to discovery under Rule 4001 et seq. If the
defendant is genuinely seeking information, it is there-
fore preferable to omit making objection to the complaint
and to make use of discovery procedures....
The attitude of the courts is in harmony with the concept
of the purpose of pleadings of informing the court and
the adverse party of what is in controversy and therefore
is increasingly likely to find judicial favor.7 4
V. THE PLEADING OF SPECIAL DAMAGES: CURRENT PRACTICES
The pleading of special damages in Pennsylvania cannot be
divided into well-defined categories as was done with general dam-
ages above. The reason for this is that the required specificity
varies both with the particular requirements of the several com-
mon pleas courts and with the particular nature of the special
damage being claimed. An examination of all items of special dam-
ages and the proper method of pleading them in a personal in-
jury action is beyond the scope of this Comment. However, in the
section to follow, particular items of damages are examined in
terms of how various common pleas courts require them to be
pleaded. Though these courts are often split on the issue of whether
the damage is a general one or a special one, the requirements of
those courts viewing the damage to be a special one will be set out
and should be consulted in order to get at least an idea as to how
special damages are conmonly pleaded in Pennsylvania.
VI. CATEGORIZATION OF FOUR SELECTED ITEMS OF DAMAGE
GENERAL OR SPECIAL
Four specific items of damage that are frequently claimed in a
personal injury action have been selected for examination in depth
in this Comment: (1) hospital and medical expenses, (2) loss of
earnings, (3) impairment of earning capacity and (4) pain and suf-
fering. The first three were picked to represent the current con-
troversy in Pennsylvania, first, on whether the item is a general
or special damage and, second, on lWw to plead it properly in the
complaint once the first determination has been made. The
fourth item, pain and suffering, was chosen because any examina-
tion of the personal injury area would be incomplete without in-
cluding a discussion of the proper pleading of this frequently
claimed item of damage.
A. Pleading Pain and Suffering in Pennsylvania
Of the four specific items of recovery to be discussed, pain and




suffering is the only one on which the common pleas courts are in
complete agreement. Pain and suffering is, without exception, con-
sidered to be a general item of damage.7 5 This is true whether re-
covery is being sought up to the time of the complaint (past pain
and suffering) or whether recovery is being claimed for beyond
that point in time (future pain and suffering) .7
Due to the agreed upon status of pain and suffering as a gen-
eral damage, the only pleading requirements are (1) a sufficient
statement of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff and (2) a gen-
eral allegation that damages are being claimed for pain and suf-
fering whether past, future or both, as a result of the stated in-
juries.77 No price tag should be placed on the claimed damage by
the pleader since the evaluation of this claim is the sole province of
the jury only after it has heard all the evidence.
78
B. The Pleading of Hospital and Medical Expenses in Pennsyl-
vania
Unlike pain and suffering, there is no uniformity in the
Pennsylvania common pleas courts in the pleading of hospital and
medical expenses in a personal injury action.7 9 Not only is there a
dispute over whether they should be considered items of general or
of special damage, but also, even once this determination has been
made, there is still no uniformity, particularly in those counties tag-
ging it as a special damage, as to how to plead such expenses cor-
rectly.
Several counties have held uniformly that a claim for past hos-
tal and/or medical expenses is a general item of damage and is to be
pleaded accordingly.8 0
75. Boyer v. Krall, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 36 (C.P. Leb. 1969); Ziegenfuss
v. Reed, 62 Sch. Leg. Rec. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1966); Ball v. Fenstermaker, 8 Lyco.
60, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 312 (C.P. 1961); Eby v. Sun Pipe Line Co., 21 Pa. D. &
C.2d 190 (C.P. Leh. 1960); Eget v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 49
Luz. Leg. Reg. 147 (Pa. C.P. 1957); Pichcuskie v. Antonio, 27 Northumb. L.J.
108 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Quick v. Lichtenwalner, 84 Pa. D. & C. 546 (C.P.
Columb. 1953); Caplan v. Levinson, 13 Fay. L.J. 84 (Pa. C.P. 1950); Watson
v. Rich, 42 Pa. D. & C. 475 (C.P. Mercer 1941); Krulawecz v. Hudson Coal
Co., 42 Lack. Jur. 122 (Pa. C.P. 1940).
76. Magdule v. Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192 (C.P. Leb. 1968); Eget v.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 49 Luz. Leg. Reg. 147 (Pa. C.P. 1957);
Krulawecz v. Hudson Coal Co., 42 Lack. Jur. 122 (Pa. C.P. 1940).
77. See note 51 supra. There is no question of the inapplicability of
Method 3 because pain and suffering is not a damage susceptible of item-
ization.
78. Zellem v. Herring, 102 F. Supp. 105 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
79. For a brief discussion of this subject see Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 760
(1964).
80. Bucks County: Davis v. Carr, 61 Pa. D. & C. 479 (C.P. Bucks
Other counties have likewise held that past hospital and medi-
cal expenses are items of general damage but these counties have
not done so uniformly in that decisions can be found in each of the
jurisdictions that have categorized the damage as being special. s
The majority of the common pleas courts which have consid-
ered the question have held past hospital and medical expenses to
be special items of damage and require them to be so pleaded.
Many of these counties, however, have not included in their deci-
sions guidelines as to the particular manner they wish them to be
alleged in the complaint.8 2 One county falls into this same cate-
gory but with one reservation. 83 An earlier decision held that hos-
pital and medical expenses are items of general damage.8 4 How-
ever, since the court in this earlier decision was faced with a rela-
tively uncommon situation in that no money for medical expenses
had yet been paid out at the time of the filing of the complaint, the
decision is clearly not authoritative in the normal situation where
money has been paid out before the filing of the complaint.8 5
The common pleas courts in the counties of Lehigh, Luzerne
and Schuylkill appear to be unable to come to a definite decision
on how past hospital and medical expenses should be pleaded. Each
of these three courts have held at various times that out-of-pocket
hospital and medical expenses are (1) general damages," (2) spe-
cial damages but include no explanation of the manner in which
they are to be set out in the complaint 7 and (3) special damages
but including an explanation of the proper method of alleging
1948); Lebanon County: Boyer v. Krall, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 36 (C.P. Leb.
1969); Washington County: Gaidos v. McCans, 22 Wash. 140 (Pa. C.P. 1942);
Westmoreland County: Deligatti v. Mt. Pleasant Borough, 76 Pa. D. & C. 200
(C.P. West. 1951).
81. Lehigh County: Pretz v. Fricke, 20 Leh. L.J. 405 (Pa. C.P. 1944);
Luzerne County: Nickerson v. Boro of Kingston, 42 Luz. Leg. Reg. 167
(Pa. C.P. 1951); Mercer County: Watson v. Rich, 42 Pa. D. & C. 475
(C.P. Mercer 1941); Schuylkill County: Ziegenfuss v. Reed, 62 Sch. Leg.
Rec. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1966) (this case is the most recent Schuylkill County deci-
sion on this point).
82. Crawford County: Bedillion v. Scholl, 3 Craw. 278 (Pa. C.P.
1963); Cumberland County: McHale v. Sunday, 8 Cumb. 115 (Pa. C.P.
1958); Fayette County: Caplan v. Levinson, 13 Fay. L.J. 84 (Pa. C.P.
1950); Climpson v. Ruse, 12 Fay. L.J. 44 (Pa. C.P. 1949); Lancaster County:
Kofsky v. Harris, 44 Lanc. Rev. 260, 48 York 124 (C.P. Lanc. 1934); Daveler
v. Fisher, 42 Lanc. Rev. 703, 16 Pa. D. & C. 601 (C.P. 1931); Lawrence
County: Peluso v. Primo, 14 Law. L.J. 85 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Monroe County:
Santoianni v. Geaslen, 16 Monroe 66 (Pa. C.P. 1953).
83. Kearns v. Peterson, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 213 (C.P. Mercer 1961).
84. Watson v. Rich, 42 Pa. D. & C. 475 (C.P. Mercer 1941).
85. Id.
86. Pretz v. Fricke, 20 Leh. L.J. 405 (Pa. C.P. 1944); Nickerson v.
Boro of Kingston, 42 Luz. Leg. Reg. 167 (Pa. C.P. 1952); Ziegenfuss v. Reed,
62 Sch. Leg. Rec. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1966); Boyle v. Veterans Home of Tamaqua,
51 Sch. Leg. Rec. 46 (Pa. C.P. 1955).
87. Passigli v. Lipson, 26 Leh. L.J. 413, 69 York Leg. Rec. 138 (C.P.
Leh. 1955); Shipton v. Smulowitz, 36 Luz. Leg. Reg. 351 (Pa. C.P. 1943);
Misner v. Service Coal Co., 45 Sch. Leg. Rec. 185 (Pa. C.P. 1950).
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them. 8 The most recent of these cases indicates that Schuylkill
County 9 now considers hospital and medical expenses to be items
of general damage while Lehigh County90 and Luzerne County9'
have most recently designated them as items of special damage.
Several common pleas courts have indicated how the pleader
should set out specifically in the complaint the claimed out-of-
pocket expenses for hospital and medical bills.
9 2
Finally, there are three common pleas courts which on two
or more occasions have set out their requirements for specially
pleading these out-of-pocket expenses. However, these decisions
have differed to such a degree that it would be improper to state
that they are compatible holdings.93
88. Mann v. Leith, 26 Leh. L.J. 305 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Eget v. Pennsyl-
vania Power & Light Co., 49 Luz. Leg. Reg. 147 (Pa. C.P. 1957); Mellet v.
Fishman, 43 Luz. Leg. Reg. 253 (Pa. C.P. 1953); Luckenbill v. Kaska Coal
Corp., 57 Sch. Leg. Rec. 158 (Pa. C.P. 1961); Groskettler v. Rudnick, 54 Sch.
Leg. Rec. 145 (Pa. C.P. 1958); Michael v. Yashan, 53 Sch. Leg. Rec. 21 (Pa.
C.P. 1957); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. Stoppi, 50 Sch. Leg. Rec. 193
(Pa. C.P. 1953).
89. Ziegenfuss v. Reed, 62 Sch. Leg. Rec. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1966).
90. Mann v. Leith, 26 Leh. L.J. 305 (Pa. C.P. 1955).
91. Eget v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 49 Luz. Leg. Reg. 147
(Pa. C.P. 1957).
92. Adams County: a) a specification of the amounts expended,
b) to whom expended, c) for what purpose the expenditures
were made. Fontana v. Mellot, 4 Adams L.J. 162 (Pa. C.P.
1963);
Centre County: a) the amount expended, b) the purpose of the
treatment, c) to whom the expenditures were made. Sprout v.
Veterans Home Club, 2 Centre L.J. 79 (Pa. C.P. 1961);
Erie County: a) an itemization of the amounts expended, b)
whether the amounts have been actually paid or not. Orton
v. Jordon, 29 Erie 80, 57 Pa. D. & C. 291 (C.P. 1947);
Lackawanna County: a) the amount of each item of expense, b) to
whom the amounts were paid. Rosen v. Strohl, 44 Lack. Jur.
257, 48 Pa. D. & C. 168 (Pa. C.P. 1943); Krulawecz v. Hudson
Coal Co., 42 Lack. Jur. 122 (Pa. C.P. 1940);
Lehigh County: a) the total amount alleged to have been ex-
pended, b) a segregation of the specific items specifying the
amount of each, c) the persons to whom it was paid. Mann v.
Leith, 26 Leh. L.J. 305 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Passigli v. Lipson, 26
Leh. L.J. 413, 69 York Leg. Rec. 138 (C.P. Leh. 1955);
Luzerne County: a) how much has already been paid and how
much is still owed for medicine, for doctors and for nurses,
b) to whom the amounts were paid or are still owed. Mellet
v. Fishman, 43 Luz. Leg. Reg. 253 (Pa. C.P. 1953); Shipton v.
Smulowitz, 36 Luz. Leg. Reg. 351 (Pa. C.P. 1943);
Northumberland County: a) amount expended, b) to whom it was
expended, c) the addresses of those to whom it was paid, d)
when the money was paid, e) where the treatment took place.
Sharp v. Karlak, 14 Northumb. L.J. 386 (Pa. C.P. 1940); Wil-
son v. Pardoe, 13 Northumb. L.J. 270 (Pa. C.P. 1937).
93. The following are the areas of compatibility and incompatibility
found in the decisions of the three counties:
Dauphin County: Agreement on a) a specific statement of what
hospital care, doctors' services and incidentals were needed,
Unlike the case of past hospital and medical expenses, com-
paratively few courts have had to decide how future hospital and
medical expenses should be pleaded, that is, how the plaintiff should
indicate to the defendant in the complaint that there will be a need
to spend more money for medical treatment other than those ex-
penditures listed as out-of-pocket expenses. Seven common pleas
courts have decided the question. The opinions illustrate that
there are many diverse viewpoints on how future medical and
hospital expenses should be pleaded 4
b) the amount expended itemized for each separate expense,
c) to whom the amounts were paid. Price v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 72 Dauph. 336, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 518 (C.P. 1958); Withers
v. Sheffer, 65 Dauph. 394 (Pa. C.P. 1953); Smith v. Willits Shoe
Co., 53 Dauph. 64 (Pa. C.P. 1942); Kushel v. Steinberger, 40
Dauph. 383 (Pa. C.P. 1935);
Disagreement on whether the particular medicines used
must be alleged. Withers v. Sheffer, 65 Dauph. 394 (Pa. C.P.
1953); Kushel v. Steinberger, 40 Dauph. 383 (Pa. C.P. 1935);
Montgomery County: Agreement on a) an itemization of the
amounts expended, b) to what doctors, hospitals or other in-
stitutions the amounts were paid, c) the general nature of the
treatment received. Brandeis v. Kenny, 82 Montg. L.R. 114, 31
Pa. D. & C.2d 347 (C.P. 1963); Weber v. Shaffer, 71 Montg. L.R.
58 (Pa. C.P. 1954); Winders v. Elby, 68 Montg. L.R. 288 (Pa. C.P.
1952); Brehony v. Esrey, 60 Montg. L.R. 207 (Pa. C.P. 1944);
Disagreement on a) whether the complaint must indicate
what amounts have been paid and what amounts are still
owed, b) the necessity of including the period of time confined
in the hospital and at home. Brandeis v. Kenny, 82 Montg.
L.R. 114, 31 Pa. D. & C.2d 347 (C.P. 1963); Winders v. Elby, 68
Montg. L.R. 288 (Pa. C.P. 1952);
Schuylkill County: As was pointed out in note 86 supra, the most
recent decision in Schuylkill County held that past hospital and
medical expenses was an item of general damage requiring
only a general allegation;
Agreement on a) a segregation of the items of expense, b)
a specification on the amount of each item, c) to whom each
item was paid. Luckenbill v. Kaska Coal Corp., 57 Sch. Leg. Rec.
158 (Pa. C.P. 1961); Groskettler v. Rudnick, 54 Sch. Leg. Rec.
145 (Pa. C.P. 1958); Michael v. Yashan, 53 Sch. Leg. Rec. 21 (Pa.
C.P. 1957); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. v. Stoppi, 50 Sch.
Leg. Rec. 193 (Pa. C.P. 1953);
Disagreement on which details must necessarily be pleaded
and which are merely evidentiary matters. Michael v. Yashan,
53 Sch. Leg. Rec. 21 (Pa. C.P. 1957); Pennsylvania Power &
Light Co. v. Stoppi, 50 Sch. Leg. Rec. 193 (Pa. C.P. 1953).
94. Crawford County: they do not need to be pleaded at all.
Bedillion v. Scholl, 3 Craw. 278 (Pa. C.P. 1963);
Dauphin County: if the expenses can be ascertained before the
complaint is filed they must be itemized in the complaint; if
they are not ascertainable at that time then the minimum re-
quirement is that the need for them must be alleged. Price
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 72 Dauph. 336, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 518
(C.P. 1958);
Fayette County: only the necessity for the future expenditures
must be alleged. Caplan v. Levinson, 13 Fay. L.J. 84 (Pa.
C.P. 1950);
Lancaster County: they must be specially pleaded. Kofsky v.
Harris, 44 Lanc. Rev. 260 (Pa. C.P. 1934);
Monroe County: only the facts known to the plaintiff when he
filed the complaint must be alleged. Santoianni v. Geaslen, 16
Monroe 66 (Pa. C.P. 1953);
Montgomery County: a full disclosure of all the injuries and liq-
uidated expenses plus a general allegation of the need for fu-
ture expenditures is sufficient to put defendant on notice that
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C. The Pleading of Loss of Earnings in Pennsylvania
Another very frequently claimed item of damages in personal
injury actions is the loss of earnings or time.9 5 Compensation for
this damage resulting from a personal injury is to be measured by
the amount of money which the injured party might have reason-
ably earned in the same period of time by the pursuit of his ordi-
nary occupation.96
One of the Pennsylvania common pleas courts in two recent
opinions has stated that it is no longer proper to include a claim for
loss of earnings in a complaint.9 7 Instead, according to this court,
the proper recovery is for loss of earning capacity, with the actual
loss of earnings only evidence, but not conclusive evidence, of this
loss or reduction of earning capacity.98 Three Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court decisions were cited as authority for this position.0 9
A close reading of these three cases indicates, however, that they do
not stand for the proposition that loss of earnings is an improper
separate item of damages today in a personal injury action. What
the cases actually hold is that when loss of earning capacity is being
claimed, loss of earnings is not the conclusive standard by which to
measure such a loss of the capacity to earn. 100 The interpretation
that loss of earnings cannot be claimed as a separate item of recov-
ery is clearly erroneous. None of the other common pleas courts
herein surveyed have given such a reading to the cited appellate
authority. This is indicated by the fact that they currently still en-
tertain claims for loss of earnings.
The overwhelming weight of authority in Pennsylvania is that
past loss of earnings is an item of special damages and accordingly
must be pleaded with particularity. As was the case with hospital
he will have to obtain further information, when it becomes
available, through the use of discovery techniques. Winders v.
Elby, 68 Montg. L.R. 288 (Pa. C.P. 1952);
Schuylkill County: since damages to be sustained in the future are
not capable of itemization, all the plaintiff must do is to fur-
nish legally adequate proof that treatment will be required and
what it will cost. Williamson v. Carey, 37 Pa. D. & C. 653
(C.P. Sch. 1940).
95. Hereinafter referred to only as loss of earnings.
96. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 86 (1966); 11 PA. L. ENCY. Damages § 55
(1970).
97. Boyer v. Krall, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 36, 39 (C.P. Leb. 1969); Magdule
v. Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192, 197 (C.P. Leb. 1968).
98. Cases cited note 97 supra.
99. Sherman v. Manufacturers Light & Heat Co., 389 Pa. 61, 132 A.2d
255 (1957); Mazi v. McAnlis, 365 Pa. .114, 74 A.2d 108 (1950); Saganowich v.
Hachikian, 348 Pa. 313, 35 A.2d 343 (1944).
100. E.g., Saganowich v. Hachikian, 348 Pa. 313, 316, 35 A.2d 343, 345
(1944).
and medical expenses, however, the common pleas courts are not in
agreement as to the form this special pleading must take.
Only one common pleas court, Schuylkill County, has ruled
that a claim for past loss of earnings is an item of general damage.10 '
This 1966 decision is in direct conflict with a long line of Schuylkill
County cases which had categorized past loss of earnings as a spe-
cial damage. 102
The decisions of several common pleas courts, while clearly
holding that past loss of earnings is to be specially pleaded, have
failed to establish guidelines for the draftsman to follow in order
to insure sufficient particularity of his allegation.'
0 3
Many courts have indicated in their decisions the manner in
which they want past loss of earnings to be pleaded.
0 4
101. Ziegenfuss v. Reed, 62 Sch. Leg. Rec. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1966).
102. Osborn v. Shulkaitis, 55 Sch. Leg. Rec. 5 (Pa. C.P. 1958); Boyle v.
Veterans Home of Tamaqua, 51 Sch. Leg. Rec. 46 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Katz v.
Rusteka, 50 Sch. Leg. Rec. 75 (Pa. C.P. 1954); Dunsavage v. Zelonis, 48
Sch. Leg. Rec. 8 (Pa. C.P. 1952).
103. Crawford County: Bedillion v. Scholl, 3 Craw. 278 (Pa. C.P. 1963);
Fayette County: Caplan v. Levinson, 13 Fay. L.J. 84 (Pa. C.P. 1950); Climp-
son v. Ruse, 12 Fay. L.J. 44 (Pa. C.P. 1949); Lehigh County: Pretz v. Fricke,
20 Leh. L.J. 405 (Pa. C.P. 1944) (dictum); Lycoming County: Myers v.
Sechler, 7 Lyco. 84 (Pa. C.P. 1959).
104. Adams County: a) the occupation of the plaintiff, b) the finan-
cial loss resulting from the injury. Pittman v. Powell, 9
Adams 113 (Pa. C.P. 1967);
Beaver County: the earnings of the plaintiff before the injury.
Bowers v. Borough of New Brighton, 14 Beaver 200 (Pa. C.P.
1954);
Centre County: a) plaintiff's employment before the injury, b)
the period of disability, c) the earnings resulting from that em-
ployment. Sprout v. Veterans Home Club, 2 Centre L.J. 79
(Pa. C.P. 1961);
Dauphin County: a) the occupation of the plaintiff, b) his salary,
c) the period of disability including the specific dates, d) the
amount of damage claimed. Withers v. Sheffer, 65 Dauph. 394
(Pa. C.P. 1953); Smith v. Willits Shoe Co., 53 Dauph. 64 (Pa.
C.P. 1942);
Lackawanna County: a) the occupation of the plaintiff, b) the nor-
mal salary or wages earned, c) the specific time missed due to
the injury, d) name of employer. Rosen v. Strohl, 44 Lack.
Jur. 257 (Pa. C.P. 1943); Shargay v. Lawrence, 31 Pa. D. & C.
239 (C.P. Lack. 1938);
Luzerne County: a) the nature of plaintiff's employment, b) the
plaintiff's salary. Mellet v. Fishman, 43 Luz. Leg. Reg. 253
(Pa. C.P. 1953);
Mercer County: a) the employment of plaintiff, b) not necessary to
plead the rate of pay, the amount of lost wages and the spe-
cific period of time lost since such information is really evi-
dence and not necessary facts, c) the loss of earning ability
resulting from the injuries. Kearns v. Peterson, 25 Pa. D. & C.
2d 213 (C.P. Mercer 1961);
Mifflin County: a) the dates and hours missed from normal em-
ployment, b) basis for computing loss of earnings. Sausser v.
Johnston, 1 Mifflin L.J. 135 (Pa. C.P. 1965);
Monroe County: a) the nature of the occupation, b) the period of
time lost by the plaintiff due to the injury, c) the earning
capacity. Santioanni v. Geaslen, 16 Monroe 66 (Pa. C.P. 1953);
Montgomery County: a) plaintiff's occupation, b) the earnings or
wages lost up to the date of the filing of the complaint, c) the
regular earnings of the plaintiff before the injury. Winders
v. Elby, 68 Montg. L.R. 288 (Pa. C.P. 1952); Brehony v. Esrey,
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The issue of how to properly plead a claim for future loss of
earnings has rarely been before the common pleas courts of
Pennsylvania. Only three decisions could be found which have
dealt with this question and none of the three could be considered to
contain a thorough discussion of the issue.
A 1938 Lackawanna County case held that to be considered cor-
rectly pleaded the allegation for future loss of earnings must be
made in definite terms.'0 5 In other words, it must be apparent from
the allegation that there is more than a mere probability that loss
of earnings will continue in the future. 106 The Court of Common
Pleas of Fayette County held in 1950 that the claim is properly
pleaded if the necessity for the future loss of earnings is sufficiently
particularized. 107 Finally, in a 1953 Monroe County decision, the
court's opinion implies that as long as the claim for past loss of
earnings is sufficiently pleaded, future loss of earnings can be
sought without including more than a general allegation that it is
being claimed. 108
D. The Pleading of Impairment of Earning Capacity in Pennsyl-
vania
The fourth and final item of damages to be examined in terms
of how the item should be correctly pleaded in a personal injury
action in Pennsylvania is the impairment of earning capacity re-
sulting from the injury or injuries suffered. The Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court has held that the proper evaluation of such a claim
is to be based on a comparison of the plaintiff's ability to earn
money before his injury and his ability to earn money after his in-
jury. The difference between the two is the correct assessment of
the damage.10 9 As was pointed out earlier, damages are not to be
60 Montg. L.R. 207 (Pa. C.P. 1944);
Northumberland County: a) plaintiff's occupation, b) the name of
plaintiff's employer, c) the regular wages of the plaintiff,
d) the specific dates the injuries prevented him from work-
ing. Sharp v. Karlak, 14 Northumb. L.J. 386 (Pa. C.P. 1940);
Wilson v. Pardoe, 13 Northumb. L.J. 270 (Pa. C.P. 1937);
Schuylkill County: a) the identity of the employer, b) the usual
compensation received by the plaintiff prior to the injury, c)
the amount of time lost from work. Osborn v. Shulkaitis, 55
Sch. Leg. Rec. 74 (Pa. C.P. 1958); Boyle v. Veterans Home of
Tamaqua, 51 Sch. Leg. Rec. 46 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Katz v. Rusteka,
50 Sch. Leg. Rec. 74 (Pa. C.P. 1954); Dunsavage v. Zelonis, 48
Sch. Leg. Rec. 8 (Pa. C.P. 1952).
105. Shargay v. Lawrence, 31 Pa. D. & C. 239 (C.P. Lack. 1938).
106. Id.
107. Caplan v. Levinson, 13 Fay. L.J. 84 (Pa. C.P. 1950).
108. Santoianni v. Geaslen, 16 Monroe 66 (Pa. C.P. 1953).
109. Krniotek v. Anast, 350 Pa. 593, 39 A.2d 923 (1945); Goodhart v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 177 Pa. 1, 35 A. 191 (1896).
measured solely on the basis of actual earnings before and after the
injury.110 Other factors such as age, health, occupation and station
in life must also be taken into consideration"'
Apparently, several of the common pleas courts fail to recog-
nize the distinction between a claim for loss of earnings and one for
impairment of earning capacity. Their opinions indicate that they
use the terms interchangeably and that they consider the damages
plaintiff may recover to be the same regardless of which item of
damages is alleged in the complaint. 1 2 It must be reiterated that
such a position is clearly incorrect. Loss of earnings and impair-
ment of earning capacity are two distinct items of damages and
should be so treated by the courts.
The common pleas courts which have considered the matter are
divided on whether a claim for the impairment of earning capacity
up to the filing of the complaint is an item of general damage or of
special damage. A few counties have required only a general alle-
gation in the complaint. 113 On the other hand, the common pleas
courts of several counties have required impairment of earning ca-
pacity to be pleaded specially.'
1 4
The Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County has, in sep-
arate decisions, held impairment of earning capacity to be both a
special item of damage 1 5 and a general item of damage. 116 The
most recent of these decisions supported the latter position.
11 7
The great majority of these jurisdictions requiring specificity of
pleading have indicated that to be sufficiently specific an allega-
tion of impairment of earning capacity should contain what the
plaintiff's occupation was prior to the accident plus the manner in
110. Mazi v. McAnlis, 365 Pa. 114, 74 A.2d 108 (1950).
111. Hrabak v. Hummel, 55 F. Supp. 775, 779 (E.D. Pa. 1943); James v.
Ferguson, 21 Beaver 217 (Pa. C.P. 1960).
112. Kearns v. Peterson, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 213 (C.P. Mercer 1961);
Passigli v. Lipson, 26 Leh. L.J. 413 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Santoianni v. Geaslen,
16 Monroe 66 (Pa. C.P. 1953); Winders v. Elby, 68 Montg. L.R. 288 (Pa. C.P.
1952); Brehony v. Esrey, 60 Montg. L.R. 207 (Pa. C.P. 1944).
113. Bucks County: Davis v. Carr, 61 Pa. D. & C. 479 (C.P. Bucks
1948); Fayette County: Caplan v. Levinson, 13 Fay. L.J. 84 (Pa. C.P. 1950);
Lebanon County: Boyer v. Krall, 47 Pa. D. & C.2d 36 (C.P. Leb. 1969);
Magdule v. Feather, 44 Pa. D. & C.2d 192 (C.P. Leb. 1968).
114. Beaver County: Bowers v. Borough of New Brighton, 14 Beaver
200 (Pa. C.P. 1954); Dauphin County: Price v. Pennsylvania R.R., 72
Dauph. 336, 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 518 (C.P. 1958); Erie County: Orton v. Jor-
don, 29 Erie 80, 57 Pa. D. & C. 291 (C.P. 1947); Lackawanna County:
Krulawecz v. Hudson Coal Co., 42 Lack. Jur. 122 (Pa. C.P. 1940); Lehigh
County: Passigli v. Lipson, 26 Leh. L.J. 413 (Pa. C.P. 1955); Lycoming
County: Myers v. Sechler, 7 Lyco. 84 (Pa. C.P. 1959); Montgomery
County: Weber v. Shaffer, 71 Montg. L.R. 58 (Pa. C.P. 1954); Brehony v.
Esrey, 60 Montg. L.R. 207 (Pa. C.P. 1944).
115. Luckenbill v. Kaska Coal Corp., 57 Sch. Leg. Rec. 158 (Pa. C.P.
1961), Katz v. Rusteka, 50 Sch. Leg. Rec. 74 (Pa. C.P. 1957).
116. Ziegenfuss v. Reed, 62 Sch. Leg. Rec. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1966); Boyle v.
Veterans Home of Tamaqua, 51 Sch. Leg. Rec. 46 (Pa. C.P. 1955).
117. Ziegenfuss v. Reed, 62 Sch. Leg. Rec. 7 (Pa. C.P. 1966).
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which the earning capacity was reduced by the injury"1 8 (for ex-
ample, the loss of a leg or permanent blindness).
Only two decisions were found which have decided the issue
of how to plead impairment of earning capacity accruing after the
filing of the complaint. A Lackawanna County case held that al-
though the plaintiff could not be specific about the allegation he
must at least set the allegation out separately in the complaint. 110
The other decision, a Mercer County ruling, held that where the
plaintiff alleges the loss of future earning power he need not
also state his age, past employment record and past wages earned.
120
McCormick, in his hornbook on damages, writes that impairment of




The preceeding discussion of the pleading of general and spe-
cial damages in a personal injury action in Pennsylvania made the
following major points:
1. There is little agreement among the various common
pleas courts as to which particular items of damage are to
be considered special damages and which general damages.
Even as to such frequently pleaded items as medical ex-
penses and loss of earning power, there is no uniformity of
opinion.
2. The set of definitions adopted in 1933 by the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court are of little value when used for pur-
poses of categorizing a specific item of damage as being
either general or special.
3. The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure fail to es-
tablish any definite system of pleading general and special
damages.
4. The common pleas courts, in the absence of appellate
and procedural guidelines, have established their own in-
dividual pleading practices in an "every-man-for-himself"
fashion.
5. Consequently, three different procedural methods of
pleading general damages and countless methods of plead-
ing special damages have been utilized.
6. Even those courts which have adopted similar proce-
dures have done so based upon differing rationales.
7. Not only do the pleading procedures of various counties
118. E.g., Orton v. Jordon, 29 Erie 80, 57 Pa. D. & C. 291 (C.P. 1947); cf.
Myers v. Sechler, 7 Lyco. 84 (Pa. C.P. 1959).
119. Krulawecz v. Hudson Coal Co., 42 Lack. Jur. 122 (Pa. C.P. 1940).
120. Dienes v. Roberts, 3 Mercer 267 (Pa. C.P. 1959).
121. See McCoRmIcK, supra note 12, § 8 at 37.
differ but also the decisions within a particular jurisdic-
tion frequently conflict.
VIII. CONcLUSION
It is readily apparent that there is much room for reform in
Pennsylvania in the area of pleading damages in a personal injury
action. The need for such reform has been highlighted by the re-
cent liberalization of the venue provision of the Pennsylvania Rules
of Civil Procedure relating to trespass actions. 122 The incongruity
of having to plead the same damages in two different ways de-
pending on which county the plaintiff chooses to institute the ac-
tion indicates strikingly that remedial action is needed.
The previous years of confusion in the various common pleas
courts illustrate that reform cannot be successfully carried out only
at that level. Too many conflicting opinions and rationales, plus
the sheer unlikelihood of voluntary reform succeeding in sixty-
seven different counties, would prevent the fruition of such re-
form. Instead, a comprehensive revision of existing procedures
based on a joint effort from three directions must be used.
First, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court should re-adopt the
more workable definitions of general and special damages that court
once used in Laing v. Calder.123 These definitions were based on a
strict "necessarily" standard. Such a re-adoption would benefit
the draftsman in two respects: (1) there would be established a
definite demarcation between general and special damages, and (2)
the majority of all damages claimed, on the basis of the re-adopted
definitions, would be special damages since most of the claimed
items would not "necessarily" follow from the statement of the in-
juries. 124 As a result, the pleader would be less frequently forced to
first make the troublesome determination of whether the item he is
pleading is a general damage or a special damage. It would also be
very helpful for the court, at the same time the Laing definitions
were re-adopted, to state expressly the special or general status of
the more frequently claimed items of recovery such as medical ex-
penses, loss of earnings and impairment of earning power. This ap-
pellate categorization of these traditionally troublesome damages,
even if the categorization would be only dictum in the case, would
provide an immeasurably helpful guide to the presently confused
common pleas courts. Such an appellate clarification would be of
even more critical importance if the court chooses not to re-adopt
122. PA. R. Civ. P. 1042 (1970 Supp.).
123. 8 Pa. 481 (1848); see note 8 supra.
124. Pain and suffering would presumably be the only item of damage
which "necessarily" follows from the statement of the injuries. Thus,
pain and suffering would be the only item of damage that would be con-
sidered to be a general damage in personal injury actions. McCormick
states that "few indeed are the injurious results which are 'necessary' in the
sense of being invariable and inevitable consequences of the kind of




The second step toward reform would be for the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, through its Pennsylvania Committee on Procedural
Rules, 125 to adopt a comprehensive set of rules to govern the plead-
ing of general and special damages. Particular attention should be
given by the Committee to the rules concerned with the proper
pleading of special damages since under the re-adopted definitions
most items of damages would fall into the special, rather than the
general, category. Special concern would likewise have to be given
to finding an equitable solution to the problem of insuring that the
defendant would receive in the complaint all the information to
which he is entitled without, as a result, placing an onerous burden
of specificity on the plaintiff.
The cooperation of the common pleas courts in implementing
these changes is the final, but certainly not the least important,
phase of this tripartite reorganization plan, for it is on this level
where the new procedures must succeed. These local jurisdictions
must be willing, in many cases, to disregard long observed tradi-
tions in the interest of promoting uniformity of pleading damages
throughout the state.
While this plan emphasizes specificity in pleading rather than
generality, it is believed that the plan is a very workable one. With
these definite guidelines established, the number of preliminary
objections related to the question of damages will decrease. The
plaintiff, realizing just what degree of specificity his allegations of
damages must meet, will be much more likely to comply with these
new requirements than he is under the present indefinite standards.
On the other hand, the defendant will learn to expect, and to be
satisfied with, the degree of specificity to which he is entitled and,
as a result, will be less likely to seek further information by way of
a "fishing expedition" type of preliminary objection.
Twelve years ago, Judge McKay of Mercer County suggested in
an opinion that the subject of pleading damages would be "a timely
one for review by the Pennsylvania Committee on Procedural
Rules."'126 Today, this Comment repeats that request and extends
it to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and the many common pleas
courts in the hope that such a review will result in the implemen-
tation of the suggested reforms.
THOMAS E. SCHWARTZ
125. Authority for this Committee is found in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17,
§ 63 (1962).
126. Rosenblum v. United Natural Gas Co. (No. 2), 3 Mercer 130, 135,
14 Pa. D. & C.2d 239, 244 (C.P. 1958).
